Real-time optimal energy and reserve management of electric vehicle fast charging station : hierarchical game approach

Abstract

In this paper, the aggregation of electric vehicles (EVs) and fast charging station (FCS) is modeled as a leader-followers game to provide regulation reserves for power systems. The leader of the game is FCS operator, who manages local sources and sets energy/reserve prices for EVs to increase its revenue, with the consideration of uncertain renewable sources and reserves called by the independent system operator. On the other hand, EVs act as the followers to obtain a tradeoff between the benefits from energy consumption and reserves provision, by deciding their charging and reserve strategies. The proposed game is reformulated as a bi-level optimization problem, which is solved by a mathematical programming with equilibrium constraints method. Furthermore, the existence of Stackelberg equilibriums has been proved. Effectiveness of the proposed game is verified by both single-period and multiple-periods simulation study. Simulation results demonstrate that the proposed game can increase the benefits of FCS operator and EVs simultaneously, compared with the centralized management method.