Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10356/140139
Title: Incentivizing consensus propagation in proof-of-stake based consortium blockchain networks
Authors: Kang, Jiawen
Xiong, Zehui
Niyato, Dusit
Wang, Ping
Ye, Dongdong
Kim, Dong In
Keywords: Engineering::Computer science and engineering
Issue Date: 2018
Source: Kang, J., Xiong, Z., Niyato, D., Wang, P., Ye, D. & Kim, D. I. (2018). Incentivizing consensus propagation in proof-of-stake based consortium blockchain networks. IEEE Wireless Communications Letters, 8(1), 157-160. https://dx.doi.org/10.1109/LWC.2018.2864758
Project: WASP/NTU M4082187(4080)
2017-T1-002-007 RG122/17
MOE2014-T2-2-015 ARC4/15
NRF2015-NRF-ISF001-2277
NRF2017EWT-EP003-041
Journal: IEEE Wireless Communications Letters
Abstract: In proof-of-stake based consortium blockchain networks, pre-selected miners compete to solve a crypto-puzzle with a successfully mining probability proportional to the amount of their stakes. When the puzzle is solved, the miners are encouraged to take part in mined block propagation for verification to win a transaction fee from the blockchain user. The mined block should be propagated over wired or wireless networks, and be verified as quickly as possible to decrease consensus propagation delay. In this letter, we study incentivizing the consensus propagation considering the tradeoff between the network delay of block propagation process and offered transaction fee from the blockchain user. A Stackelberg game is then formulated to jointly maximize utility of the blockchain user and individual profit of the miners. The blockchain user acting as the leader sets the transaction fee for block verification. The miners acting as the followers decide on the number of recruited verifiers over wired or wireless networks. We apply the backward induction to analyze the existence and uniqueness of the Stackelberg equilibrium. Performance evaluation validates the feasibility and efficiency of the proposed game model in consensus propagation.
URI: https://hdl.handle.net/10356/140139
ISSN: 2162-2337
DOI: 10.1109/LWC.2018.2864758
Rights: © 2018 IEEE. Personal use of this material is permitted. Permission from IEEE must be obtained for all other uses, in any current or future media, including reprinting/republishing this material for advertising or promotional purposes, creating new collective works, for resale or redistribution to servers or lists, or reuse of any copyrighted component of this work in other works. The published version is available at: https://doi.org/10.1109/LWC.2018.2864758.
Fulltext Permission: open
Fulltext Availability: With Fulltext
Appears in Collections:SCSE Journal Articles

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