Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
https://hdl.handle.net/10356/142773
Title: | Social norm and giving with indivisibility of money : an experiment on selfishness, equity, and generosity | Authors: | Bao, Te Yu, Xiaohua |
Keywords: | Social sciences::Economic theory | Issue Date: | 2019 | Source: | Bao, T., & Yu, X. (2019). Social norm and giving with indivisibility of money : an experiment on selfishness, equity, and generosity. Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, 175(2), 272-290. | Journal: | Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics | Abstract: | We study a dictator game considering selfishness, equity, and generosity. The dictators first indicate their willingness to give on a decision form and then allocate 10 yuan cash to the receiver in an envelope. The cash consists of 10 banknotes of 1 yuan in treatment 1 (high divisibility) and 2 banknotes of 5 yuan in treatment 2 (low divisibility). Treatment 2 only has three choices of giving.0;5;10/. 30% of individuals take ceilings or floors rather than the standard rounding in treatment 2. However, the individual roundup and rounddown behaviors cancel each other at the aggregate level. | URI: | https://www.mohrsiebeck.com/en/article/social-norm-and-giving-with-indivisibility-of-money-an-experiment-on-selfishness-equity-and-generosity-101628jite-2019-0020 https://hdl.handle.net/10356/142773 |
ISSN: | 0932-4569 | Rights: | © 2018 Mohr Siebeck. All rights reserved. This paper was published in Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics and is made available with permission of Mohr Siebeck. | Fulltext Permission: | open | Fulltext Availability: | With Fulltext |
Appears in Collections: | SSS Journal Articles |
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Manuscript_JITE_180815a.pdf | 409.54 kB | Adobe PDF | ![]() View/Open |
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