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Title: On L. W. Sumner’s “Normative ethics and metaethics”
Authors: Forcehimes, Andrew T.
Keywords: Humanities::Ethics
Issue Date: 2015
Source: Forcehimes, A. T. (2015). On L. W. Sumner’s “Normative ethics and metaethics”. Ethics, 125(4), 1142-1144. doi:10.1086/680881
Journal: Ethics
Abstract: Due largely to the influential work of Ronald Dworkin, there is an ongoing debate concerning the possibility of genuine metaethical theorizing. Those suspicious of the possibility of metaethics argue in two steps. The first step lays down a requirement, namely, neutrality: genuine metaethical theories must avoid having first-order normative commitments. The second step maintains that the nature of metaethical theorizing is such that a breach of neutrality is inevitable. The upshot of violating neutrality is that metaethical theories turn out to be moral theories in disguise. Call this case against metaethics the collapse argument.
ISSN: 0014-1704
DOI: 10.1086/680881
Rights: © 2015 The University of Chicago. All rights reserved. This paper was published in Ethics and is made available with permission of The University of Chicago.
Fulltext Permission: open
Fulltext Availability: With Fulltext
Appears in Collections:SoH Journal Articles

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