Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
Title: Information control in the hold-up problem
Authors: Nguyen, Anh
Tan, Teck Yong
Keywords: Social sciences::Economic theory
Issue Date: 2019
Source: Nguyen, A., & Tan, T. Y. (2019). Information control in the hold‐up problem. The RAND Journal of Economics, 50(4), 768–786. doi:10.1111/1756-2171.12295
Journal: RAND Journal of Economics
Abstract: We study the use of information control to mitigate hold-up risks. We identify a distinction between asymmetric information that creates an ex ante investment incentive and asymmetric information that causes ex post inefficiency, which then allows ex post inefficiency to be eliminated without compromising the ex ante investment incentive. We characterize the properties of the optimal information structure and the payoffs and welfare achievable with information control in the presence of hold-up risks.
ISSN: 0741-6261
DOI: 10.1111/1756-2171.12295
Schools: School of Social Sciences 
Rights: This is the accepted version of the following article: Nguyen, A., & Tan, T. Y. (2019). Information control in the hold‐up problem. The RAND Journal of Economics, 50(4), 768–786., which has been published in final form at doi:10.1111/1756-2171.12295. This article may be used for non-commercial purposes in accordance with the Wiley Self-Archiving Policy [].
Fulltext Permission: open
Fulltext Availability: With Fulltext
Appears in Collections:SSS Journal Articles

Files in This Item:
File Description SizeFormat 
Information Control in the Hold-up Problem.pdf493.34 kBAdobe PDFThumbnail

Citations 50

Updated on Jun 19, 2024

Web of ScienceTM
Citations 20

Updated on Oct 24, 2023

Page view(s)

Updated on Jun 20, 2024

Download(s) 50

Updated on Jun 20, 2024

Google ScholarTM




Items in DR-NTU are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.