Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
Full metadata record
DC FieldValueLanguage
dc.contributor.authorXiong, Zehuien_US
dc.contributor.authorFeng, Shaohanen_US
dc.contributor.authorNiyato, Dusiten_US
dc.contributor.authorWang, Pingen_US
dc.contributor.authorLeshem, Amiren_US
dc.contributor.authorHan, Zhuen_US
dc.identifier.citationXiong, Z., Feng, S., Niyato, D., Wang, P., Leshem, A., & Han, Z. (2019). Joint Sponsored and Edge Caching Content Service Market: A Game-Theoretic Approach. IEEE Transactions on Wireless Communications, 18(2), 1166–1181. doi:10.1109/twc.2018.2890469en_US
dc.description.abstractIn a sponsored content scheme, a wireless network operator negotiates with a sponsored content service provider where the latter can pay the former to lower the cost of the mobile subscribers/users to access certain content. As such, the scheme motivates the entities in the sponsored content ecosystem to be more actively involved. Meanwhile, with the forthcoming 5G cellular networks, edge caching becomes a promising technology for traffic offloading to reduce cost and improve service quality of the content service. The key idea is that an edge caching content service provider caches content on edge networks. The cached content is then delivered to mobile users locally, reducing latency substantially. In this paper, we propose the joint sponsored and edge caching content service market model. We investigate an interplay between the sponsored content service provider and the edge caching content service provider under the non-cooperative game framework. Furthermore, the interactions among the wireless network operator, content service providers, and mobile users are modeled as a hierarchical three-stage Stackelberg game. In the game model, we analyze the sub-game perfect equilibrium in each stage through backward induction analytically. Additionally, the existence of the proposed Stackelberg equilibrium is validated by capitalizing on the bilevel optimization programming. Based on the analysis of the game properties, we propose a sub-gradient-based iterative algorithm, which guarantees to converge to the Stackelberg equilibrium.en_US
dc.description.sponsorshipEnergy Market Authority (EMA)en_US
dc.description.sponsorshipMinistry of Education (MOE)en_US
dc.description.sponsorshipNational Research Foundation (NRF)en_US
dc.relation.ispartofIEEE Transactions on Wireless Communicationsen_US
dc.rights© 2019 IEEE. Personal use of this material is permitted. Permission from IEEE must be obtained for all other uses, in any current or future media, including reprinting/republishing this material for advertising or promotional purposes, creating new collective works, for resale or redistribution to servers or lists, or reuse of any copyrighted component of this work in other works. The published version is available at:
dc.subjectEngineering::Computer science and engineeringen_US
dc.titleJoint sponsored and edge caching content service market : a game-theoretic approachen_US
dc.typeJournal Articleen
dc.contributor.schoolSchool of Computer Science and Engineeringen_US
dc.description.versionAccepted versionen_US
dc.subject.keywordsSponsored Contenten_US
dc.subject.keywordsEdge Cachingen_US
dc.description.acknowledgementThis work was supported in part by WASP/NTU M4082187 (4080),Singapore MOE Tier 1 under Grant 2017-T1-002-007 RG122/17, MOE Tier2 under Grant MOE2014-T2-2-015 ARC4/15, NRF2015-NRF-ISF001-2277,EMA Energy Resilience under Grant NRF2017EWT-EP003-041, and ISF-NRF grant no. 2277/2016. The work was also supported in part by USMURI AFOSR MURI 18RT0073 , NSF CNS-1717454, CNS- 1731424, CNS-1702850, CNS-1646607,ECCS-1547201en_US
item.fulltextWith Fulltext-
Appears in Collections:SCSE Journal Articles
Files in This Item:
File Description SizeFormat 
Joint sponsored and edge caching content service market a game theoretic approach.pdf2.34 MBAdobe PDFView/Open

Citations 20

Updated on Mar 6, 2021

Page view(s)

Updated on Apr 15, 2021


Updated on Apr 15, 2021

Google ScholarTM




Items in DR-NTU are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.