Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10356/14391
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dc.contributor.authorToh, Boon Kwan.en_US
dc.date.accessioned2008-11-13T09:18:50Z-
dc.date.available2008-11-13T09:18:50Z-
dc.date.copyright2004en_US
dc.date.issued2004-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10356/14391-
dc.description.abstractUsing newly released declassified government records from the British archives, this thesis revises the prevalent notion that Britain successfully deterred Indonesia from further escalation of hostilities during Confrontation due to its successful conduct of the Sunda Straits Crisis. It argues that it was Indonesia, not Britain, which was successful in deterring its opponent during the crisis.The factors for successful Indonesian deterrence during the Sunda Straits Crisis contradict the prevalent view on brinkmanship crises that statesmen should refrain from brinkmanship since they are unlikely to achieve their political goals at minimum costs to themselves. Brinkmanship, under the conditions detailed in this study, does pay off.en_US
dc.rightsNanyang Technological Universityen_US
dc.subjectDRNTU::Humanitiesen_US
dc.titleWho blinked? Britain and the Sunda Straits Crisis, 1964-66.en_US
dc.typeThesisen_US
dc.contributor.supervisorKhong, Yuen Foongen_US
dc.contributor.schoolS. Rajaratnam School of International Studiesen_US
dc.description.degreeMaster of Science (Strategic Studies)en_US
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