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Title: Fairness and incentives in committee election
Authors: Ly, Tevbot
Keywords: Science::Mathematics::Discrete mathematics
Issue Date: 2020
Publisher: Nanyang Technological University
Abstract: The committee election problem is to choose from a finite set of candidates a fixed size subset of committee members. The function to do so is called committee election rule. The committee election rule takes in the input of voters' preference information and produces an output of a committee. We want the committee election rule to satisfy some desirable properties. Notions of fairness and strategyproofness are studied extensively in the vast majority of the literature of the sort. In general, we want the committee to be able to "fairly" represent their voters and to be strategyproof and therefore is not subject to voter manipulation. The objective of this paper is to study the existence of such election rule that satisfy these two important properties and to provide the algorithm in finding these election rules in the cases that they exist.
Schools: School of Physical and Mathematical Sciences 
Fulltext Permission: restricted
Fulltext Availability: With Fulltext
Appears in Collections:SPMS Student Reports (FYP/IA/PA/PI)

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