Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10356/145498
Title: Value in very long lives
Authors: Greene, Preston
Keywords: Humanities::Ethics
Issue Date: 2017
Source: Greene, P. (2017). Value in Very Long Lives. Journal of Moral Philosophy, 14(4), 416–434. doi:10.1163/17455243-46810057
Journal: Journal of Moral Philosophy
Abstract: As things currently stand, our deaths are unavoidable and our lifespans short. It might be thought that these qualities leave room for improvement. According to a prominent line of argument in philosophy, however, this thought is mistaken. Against the idea that a longer life would be better, it is claimed that negative psychological states, such as boredom, would be unavoidable if our lives were significantly longer. Against the idea that a deathless life would be better, it is claimed that such a life would be lacking in important sources of value, because death is a precondition for many of our valuing attitudes. I argue that these problems are avoided by very long (and potentially infinite) lives that incorporate fading memory, limited ignorance of future events, and temporal scarcity. I conclude that very long lives are, in principle, desirable, and that death does not play an essential role in our valuing attitudes.
URI: https://hdl.handle.net/10356/145498
ISSN: 1740-4681
DOI: 10.1163/17455243-46810057
Rights: © 2017 Brill Academic Publishers. All rights reserved. This paper was published in Journal of Moral Philosophy and is made available with permission of Brill Academic Publishers.
Fulltext Permission: open
Fulltext Availability: With Fulltext
Appears in Collections:SoH Journal Articles

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