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Title: Knowledge as property rights under the ratchet effect of innovation
Authors: Tan, Teck Yong 
Keywords: Social sciences::Economic theory
Issue Date: 2020
Source: Tan, T. Y. (2019). Knowledge as property rights under the ratchet effect of innovation. Journal of the European Economic Association, 18(5), 2677–2714. doi:10.1093/jeea/jvz056
Journal: Journal of the European Economic Association
Abstract: This paper studies how reduced oversight creates an incentive for process innovation. With incomplete contracts, tight monitoring of workers creates a ratchet effect of innovation. Under reduced oversight, a worker accrues private knowledge about his innovation, which serves as a substitute for its inalienable property rights. The resulting asymmetric information generates an information rent for the worker, which feeds back as an innovation incentive ex ante. A weak early production incentive is required to complement it. Innovations are generally underutilized ex post, and mildly successful innovations are not distinguished from failed innovation attempts.
ISSN: 1542-4766
DOI: 10.1093/jeea/jvz056
Rights: This is the accepted version of the following article: Tan, T. Y. (2019). Knowledge as Property Rights Under the Ratchet Effect of Innovation. Journal of the European Economic Association, 18(5), 2677–2714., which has been published in final form at doi:10.1093/jeea/jvz056. This article may be used for non-commercial purposes in accordance with the Wiley Self-Archiving Policy [].
Fulltext Permission: open
Fulltext Availability: With Fulltext
Appears in Collections:SSS Journal Articles

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