Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
Title: TAD : time side-channel attack defense of obfuscated source code
Authors: Fell, Alexander
Pham, Hung Thinh
Lam, Siew-Kei
Keywords: Engineering::Computer science and engineering
Issue Date: 2019
Source: Fell, A., Pham, H. T., & Lam, S.-K. (2019). TAD : time side-channel attack defense of obfuscated source code. Proceedings of the 24th Asia and South Pacific Design Automation Conference, 58-63. doi:10.1145/3287624.3287694
Project: NRF2016NCR-NCR001-006
Abstract: Program obfuscation is widely used to protect commercial software against reverse-engineering. However, an adversary can still download, disassemble and analyze binaries of the obfuscated code executed on an embedded System-on-Chip (SoC), and by correlating execution times to input values, extract secret information from the program. In this paper, we show (1) the impact of widely-used obfuscation methods on timing leakage, and (2) that well-known software countermeasures to reduce timing leakage of programs, are not always effective for low-noise environments found in embedded systems. We propose two methods for mitigating timing leakage in obfuscated codes. The first is a compiler driven method, called TAD, which removes conditional branches with distinguishable execution times for an input program. In the second method (TADCI), TAD is combined with dynamic hardware diversity by replacing primitive instructions with Custom Instructions (CIs) that exhibit non-deterministic execution times at runtime. Experimental results on the RISC-V platform show that the information leakage is reduced by 92% and 82% when TADCI is applied to the original and obfuscated source code, respectively.
ISBN: 9781450360074
DOI: 10.1145/3287624.3287694
Rights: © 2019 IEEE. Personal use of this material is permitted. Permission from IEEE must be obtained for all other uses, in any current or future media, including reprinting/republishing this material for advertising or promotional purposes, creating new collective works, for resale or redistribution to servers or lists, or reuse of any copyrighted component of this work in other works. The published version is available at:
Fulltext Permission: open
Fulltext Availability: With Fulltext
Appears in Collections:SCSE Conference Papers

Files in This Item:
File Description SizeFormat 
2019 Fell - TAD Time Side-Channel Attack Defense of Obfuscated Source Code.pdf693.25 kBAdobe PDFView/Open

Citations 20

Updated on Mar 5, 2021

Page view(s)

Updated on Apr 16, 2021


Updated on Apr 16, 2021

Google ScholarTM




Items in DR-NTU are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.