Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10356/146189
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dc.contributor.authorWon, Yoo-Seungen_US
dc.contributor.authorSim, Bo-Yeonen_US
dc.contributor.authorPark, Jong-Yeonen_US
dc.date.accessioned2021-01-29T07:12:56Z-
dc.date.available2021-01-29T07:12:56Z-
dc.date.issued2020-
dc.identifier.citationWon, Y.-S., Sim, B.-Y., & Park, J.-Y. (2020). Key schedule against template attack-based simple power analysis on a single target. Applied Sciences, 10(11), 3804-. doi:10.3390/app10113804en_US
dc.identifier.issn2076-3417en_US
dc.identifier.other0000-0002-5205-7530-
dc.identifier.other0000-0002-6446-1020-
dc.identifier.other0000-0002-1892-1698-
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/10356/146189-
dc.description.abstractSince 2002, there have been active discussions on template attacks due to the robust performance of such attacks. There are reports of numerous proposals to improve the accuracy of prediction model in order to identify the point of interest. To date, many researchers have only focused on the performance of template attacks. In this paper, we introduce a new approach to retrieve the secret information in key schedules, without the profiling phase utilizing secret information. The template attack allows us to reveal the correct key even though the encryption/decryption processes have powerful countermeasures. More precisely, if the templates are sufficiently built in loading/saving the public information, in the extraction phase, the templates already created can be applied to the identical operation about secret information, which allows us to retrieve the secret information even if the countermeasures are theoretically robust. This suggestion becomes another backdoor to avoid hardened countermeasures. In order to demonstrate our proposal, we consider the Advanced Encryption Standard key schedule as a target for attack; however, it cannot be the target of non-profiling attacks in general. Finally, the Hamming weight information of the correct key could be recovered in an XMEGA128 chip, without the secret information. Moreover, we concentrate on the potential possibility of our suggestion since the performance cannot outperform the original methods used in such attacks.en_US
dc.language.isoenen_US
dc.relation.ispartofApplied Sciencesen_US
dc.rights© 2020 The Author(s). Licensee MDPI, Basel, Switzerland. This article is an open access article distributed under the terms and conditions of the Creative Commons Attribution (CC BY) license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).en_US
dc.subjectEngineering::Electrical and electronic engineeringen_US
dc.titleKey schedule against template attack-based simple power analysis on a single targeten_US
dc.typeJournal Articleen
dc.contributor.researchPACE Temasek Laboratoriesen_US
dc.identifier.doi10.3390/app10113804-
dc.description.versionPublished versionen_US
dc.identifier.scopus2-s2.0-85086118966-
dc.identifier.issue11en_US
dc.identifier.volume10en_US
dc.subject.keywordsTemplate Attacken_US
dc.subject.keywordsAES Key Scheduleen_US
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