Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10356/146765
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dc.contributor.authorBouveret, Géraldineen_US
dc.contributor.authorMandel, Antoineen_US
dc.date.accessioned2021-03-10T01:57:57Z-
dc.date.available2021-03-10T01:57:57Z-
dc.date.issued2021-
dc.identifier.citationBouveret, G., & Mandel, A. (2021). Social interactions and the prophylaxis of SI epidemics on networks. Journal of Mathematical Economics, 93, 102486-. doi:10.1016/j.jmateco.2021.102486en_US
dc.identifier.issn0304-4068en_US
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/10356/146765-
dc.description.abstractWe investigate the containment of epidemic spreading in networks from a normative point of view. We consider a susceptible/infected model in which agents can invest in order to reduce the contagiousness of network links. In this setting, we study the relationships between social efficiency, individual behaviours and network structure. First, we characterise individual and socially efficient behaviour using the notions of communicability and exponential centrality. Second, we show, by computing the Price of Anarchy, that the level of inefficiency can scale up to linearly with the number of agents. Third, we prove that policies of uniform reduction of interactions satisfy some optimality conditions in a vast range of networks. In setting where no central authority can enforce such stringent policies, we consider as a type of second-best policy the implementation of cooperation frameworks that allow agents to subsidise prophylactic investments in the global rather than in the local network. We then characterise the scope for Pareto improvement opened by such policies through a notion of Price of Autarky, measuring the ratio between social welfare at a global and a local equilibrium. Overall, our results show that individual behaviours can be extremely inefficient in the face of epidemic propagation but that policy can take advantage of the network structure to design welfare improving containment policies.en_US
dc.language.isoenen_US
dc.relation.ispartofJournal of Mathematical Economicsen_US
dc.rights© 2021 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved. This paper was published in Journal of Mathematical Economics and is made available with permission of Elsevier B.V.en_US
dc.subjectScienceen_US
dc.subjectSocial sciencesen_US
dc.titleSocial interactions and the prophylaxis of SI epidemics on networksen_US
dc.typeJournal Articleen
dc.contributor.schoolSchool of Physical and Mathematical Sciencesen_US
dc.identifier.doi10.1016/j.jmateco.2021.102486-
dc.description.versionAccepted versionen_US
dc.identifier.volume93en_US
dc.identifier.spage102486en_US
dc.subject.keywordsNetworken_US
dc.subject.keywordsEpidemic Spreadingen_US
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item.grantfulltextembargo_20230401-
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