Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10356/147343
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dc.contributor.authorNg, Sarah Sin Cien_US
dc.date.accessioned2021-03-31T05:43:15Z-
dc.date.available2021-03-31T05:43:15Z-
dc.date.issued2021-
dc.identifier.citationNg, S. S. C. (2021). On evidence and rational beliefs : a thesis in defence of intrapersonal uniqueness. Final Year Project (FYP), Nanyang Technological University, Singapore. https://hdl.handle.net/10356/147343en_US
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/10356/147343-
dc.description.abstractThere are three doxastic attitudes an agent can adopt in response to a given proposition: to believe, to not believe or to withhold judgement. What can we conclude about the individual rationality of the agents who, in response to the same set of evidence, come to adopt incompatible doxastic attitudes towards a target proposition? If there exists a uniquely rational doxastic attitude that should be adopted in response to a set of evidence, then we can grant that at most one agent is being rational in any belief-disagreement cases (viz., Uniqueness). Otherwise, we can grant that more than one agent is being rational in belief-disagreement cases (viz., Permissivism). This paper defends two claims: §1 defends a specific variation of Uniqueness that has no interpersonal import (viz., Intrapersonal Uniqueness). For a particular person, there is only one doxastic attitude she can rationally hold towards a proposition based on the evidence. §2 argues that Intrapersonal Uniqueness is reconcilable with the idea of intersubjective reasonable disagreements, a phenomenon that has interpersonal import. On this view, reasonable disagreements persist, not because the evidence is permissive in what it supports, but because total evidential sharing among agents is an impossibility.en_US
dc.language.isoenen_US
dc.publisherNanyang Technological Universityen_US
dc.subjectHumanities::Philosophyen_US
dc.titleOn evidence and rational beliefs : a thesis in defence of intrapersonal uniquenessen_US
dc.typeFinal Year Project (FYP)en_US
dc.contributor.supervisorTeru Miyakeen_US
dc.contributor.schoolSchool of Humanitiesen_US
dc.description.degreeBachelor of Arts in Philosophyen_US
dc.contributor.supervisoremailTMiyake@ntu.edu.sgen_US
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Appears in Collections:SoH Student Reports (FYP/IA/PA/PI)
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