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Title: Actualism without actions
Authors: Relador, Jean Aldrin Concepcion
Keywords: Humanities::Philosophy
Issue Date: 2021
Publisher: Nanyang Technological University
Source: Relador, J. A. C. (2021). Actualism without actions. Final Year Project (FYP), Nanyang Technological University, Singapore.
Abstract: An oft-missed insight in the Actualism-Possibilism debate is that it brings to focus the relationship between actions and their consequences. Namely, an action makes a difference in what consequences obtain. The difference-making role of action is underwritten by analysing its consequences in counterfactual terms (§1). However, there is evidence for rejecting the claim that action is the primary object of moral evaluation in the debate. Namely, the evidence that human beings are clumsy and the world is chancy. Such evidence shows that most counterfactuals including action-predicating counterfactuals are false (§2). Then we can undermine the difference-making relationship between an action and its consequences. On these grounds, I argue that the primary object of moral evaluation cannot be an action and so it should be revised. My argument has two implications (§3). First, its result can break the stalemate within the debate in favour of Actualism. Second, we can frame the debate in different terms rather than the alternatives-based approach.
Fulltext Permission: restricted
Fulltext Availability: With Fulltext
Appears in Collections:SoH Student Reports (FYP/IA/PA/PI)

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