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Title: Peer disagreement, philosophical incommensurability and metaphilosophy
Authors: Muhammad Faiz Mohamad Zahari
Keywords: Humanities::Philosophy
Issue Date: 2021
Publisher: Nanyang Technological University
Source: Muhammad Faiz Mohamad Zahari (2021). Peer disagreement, philosophical incommensurability and metaphilosophy. Final Year Project (FYP), Nanyang Technological University, Singapore.
Abstract: Peer disagreement is a paradoxical issue in philosophy. If philosophers cannot maintain the rationality of how thinkers can hold on to their beliefs, they would be forced to adopt a skeptical attitude towards philosophical beliefs. Analytic philosophers have dealt with this issue by advocating for epistemological strategies that focus on maintaining rationality when thinkers are faced with peer disagreement. However, Richard Colledge suggests that Analytic philosophy needs to acknowledge the concept of philosophical incommensurability to properly respond to peer disagreement. In this thesis, I assess if Colledge’s suggestions are constructive. I provide a brief sketch of peer disagreement in Analytic philosophy, and I consider if the ideas of Heidegger and Gadamer from Continental philosophy are relevant for improving the peer disagreement debate in Analytic philosophy.
Fulltext Permission: restricted
Fulltext Availability: With Fulltext
Appears in Collections:SoH Student Reports (FYP/IA/PA/PI)

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