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Title: Joint auction-coalition formation framework for communication-efficient federated learning in UAV-enabled Internet of Vehicles
Authors: Ng, Jer Shyuan
Lim, Bryan Wei Yang
Dai, Hong-Ning
Xiong, Zehui
Huang, Jianqiang
Niyato, Dusit
Hua, Xian-Sheng
Leung, Cyril
Miao, Chunyan
Keywords: Engineering::Computer science and engineering
Issue Date: 2021
Source: Ng, J. S., Lim, B. W. Y., Dai, H., Xiong, Z., Huang, J., Niyato, D., Hua, X., Leung, C. & Miao, C. (2021). Joint auction-coalition formation framework for communication-efficient federated learning in UAV-enabled Internet of Vehicles. IEEE Transactions On Intelligent Transportation Systems, 22(4), 2326-2344.
Journal: IEEE Transactions on Intelligent Transportation Systems
Abstract: Due to the advanced capabilities of the Internet of Vehicles (IoV) components such as vehicles, Roadside Units (RSUs) and smart devices as well as the increasing amount of data generated, Federated Learning (FL) becomes a promising tool given that it enables privacy-preserving machine learning that can be implemented in the IoV. However, the performance of the FL suffers from the failure of communication links and missing nodes, especially when continuous exchanges of model parameters are required. Therefore, we propose the use of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) as wireless relays to facilitate the communications between the IoV components and the FL server and thus improving the accuracy of the FL. However, a single UAV may not have sufficient resources to provide services for all iterations of the FL process. In this paper, we present a joint auction-coalition formation framework to solve the allocation of UAV coalitions to groups of IoV components. Specifically, the coalition formation game is formulated to maximize the sum of individual profits of the UAVs. The joint auction-coalition formation algorithm is proposed to achieve a stable partition of UAV coalitions in which an auction scheme is applied to solve the allocation of UAV coalitions. The auction scheme is designed to take into account the preferences of IoV components over heterogeneous UAVs. The simulation results show that the grand coalition, where all UAVs join a single coalition, is not always stable due to the profit-maximizing behavior of the UAVs. In addition, we show that as the cooperation cost of the UAVs increases, the UAVs prefer to support the IoV components independently and not to form any coalition.
ISSN: 1558-0016
DOI: 10.1109/TITS.2020.3041345
Rights: © 2021 IEEE. Personal use of this material is permitted. Permission from IEEE must be obtained for all other uses, in any current or future media, including reprinting/republishing this material for advertising or promotional purposes, creating new collective works, for resale or redistribution to servers or lists, or reuse of any copyrighted component of this work in other works. The published version is available at:
Fulltext Permission: open
Fulltext Availability: With Fulltext
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