Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10356/152149
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dc.contributor.authorMaas, Victor S.en_US
dc.contributor.authorYin, Huaxiangen_US
dc.date.accessioned2021-12-10T15:10:02Z-
dc.date.available2021-12-10T15:10:02Z-
dc.date.issued2021-
dc.identifier.citationMaas, V. S. & Yin, H. (2021). Finding partners in crime? How transparency about managers' behavior affects employee collusion. Accounting, Organizations and Society. https://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.aos.2021.101293en_US
dc.identifier.issn0361-3682en_US
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/10356/152149-
dc.description.abstractIn this paper, we investigate how increasing transparency about managers’ treatment of their employees affects the tendency of employees to initiate collusion. Building on behavioral economics theory, we argue that employees who are treated less kindly by their managers are more willing to initiate or join a collusive agreement. We hypothesize that internal transparency affects collusion in two ways. First, by revealing how kindly employees are treated by their managers, transparency increases or decreases the probability that individuals are singled out as potential “partners in crime.” Second, increasing transparency incentivizes managers to treat employees more kindly, which in turn reduces employees’ inclination to initiate collusion. The results of two experiments generally support the theory. We discuss the implications of our study for research and practice.en_US
dc.language.isoenen_US
dc.relation.ispartofAccounting, Organizations and Societyen_US
dc.rights© 2021 The Author(s). Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).en_US
dc.subjectBusiness::Accountingen_US
dc.titleFinding partners in crime? How transparency about managers' behavior affects employee collusionen_US
dc.typeJournal Articleen
dc.contributor.schoolCollege of Business (Nanyang Business School)en_US
dc.contributor.departmentAccountingen_US
dc.identifier.doi10.1016/j.aos.2021.101293-
dc.description.versionPublished versionen_US
dc.subject.keywordsReciprocityen_US
dc.subject.keywordsCollusionen_US
dc.subject.keywordsFrauden_US
dc.subject.keywordsInternal Transparencyen_US
dc.subject.keywordsExperimenten_US
item.grantfulltextopen-
item.fulltextWith Fulltext-
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