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Title: Activist-appointed directors
Authors: Kang, Jun-Koo
Kim, Hyemin
Kim, Jungmin
Low, Angie
Keywords: Business::Finance
Issue Date: 2021
Source: Kang, J., Kim, H., Kim, J. & Low, A. (2021). Activist-appointed directors. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis.
Journal: Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis
Abstract: We examine the value impact of independent directors nominated by activists (Activist IDs). Firms appointing Activist IDs experience larger value increases than firms appointing other directors, particularly when Activist IDs have private firm experience and when their nominators remain as shareholders. This value increase persists over a long period and is greater than that of activism events without director appointments. The increase is also higher among firms with greater monitoring needs and entrenched boards. Moreover, the appointments of Activist IDs are greeted more positively by the market, and Activist IDs obtain more favorable shareholder votes and additional future directorships.
ISSN: 0022-1090
DOI: 10.1017/S0022109021000648
Rights: © 2021 The Author(s). All rights reserved. This paper was published by Cambridge University Press on behalf of Michael G. Foster School of Business, University of Washington in Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis and is made available with permission of The Author(s).
Fulltext Permission: open
Fulltext Availability: With Fulltext
Appears in Collections:NBS Journal Articles

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