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Title: Relationship sensitive consequentialism Is regrettable
Authors: Forcehimes, Andrew T. 
Semrau, Luke
Keywords: Humanities::Philosophy
Issue Date: 2020
Source: Forcehimes, A. T. & Semrau, L. (2020). Relationship sensitive consequentialism Is regrettable. Social Theory and Practice, 46(2), 257-276.
Project: RG62/19 (NS)
Journal: Social Theory and Practice
Abstract: Personal relationships matter. Traditional Consequentialism, given its exclusive focus on agent-neutral goodness, struggles to account for this fact. A recent variant of the theory—one incorporating agent-relativity—is thought to succeed where its traditional counterpart fails. Yet, to secure this advantage, the view must take on certain normative and evaluative commitments concerning personal relationships. As a result, the theory permits cases in which agents do as they ought, yet later ought to prefer that they had done otherwise. That a theory allows such cases is a serious defect. We thus conclude that, in terms of how the theories handle personal relationships, agent-relative consequentialism fairs no better than its traditional counterpart.
ISSN: 0037-802X
DOI: 10.5840/soctheorpract202032184
Rights: © 2020 Social Theory and Practice. All rights reserved.
Fulltext Permission: none
Fulltext Availability: No Fulltext
Appears in Collections:SoH Journal Articles

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