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|Title:||Relationship sensitive consequentialism Is regrettable||Authors:||Forcehimes, Andrew T.
|Keywords:||Humanities::Philosophy||Issue Date:||2020||Source:||Forcehimes, A. T. & Semrau, L. (2020). Relationship sensitive consequentialism Is regrettable. Social Theory and Practice, 46(2), 257-276. https://dx.doi.org/10.5840/soctheorpract202032184||Project:||RG62/19 (NS)||Journal:||Social Theory and Practice||Abstract:||Personal relationships matter. Traditional Consequentialism, given its exclusive focus on agent-neutral goodness, struggles to account for this fact. A recent variant of the theory—one incorporating agent-relativity—is thought to succeed where its traditional counterpart fails. Yet, to secure this advantage, the view must take on certain normative and evaluative commitments concerning personal relationships. As a result, the theory permits cases in which agents do as they ought, yet later ought to prefer that they had done otherwise. That a theory allows such cases is a serious defect. We thus conclude that, in terms of how the theories handle personal relationships, agent-relative consequentialism fairs no better than its traditional counterpart.||URI:||https://hdl.handle.net/10356/155065||ISSN:||0037-802X||DOI:||10.5840/soctheorpract202032184||Rights:||© 2020 Social Theory and Practice. All rights reserved.||Fulltext Permission:||none||Fulltext Availability:||No Fulltext|
|Appears in Collections:||SoH Journal Articles|
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