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Title: Attitudinal strength as distance to withholding
Authors: Forcehimes, Andrew T. 
Keywords: Humanities::Philosophy
Issue Date: 2021
Source: Forcehimes, A. T. (2021). Attitudinal strength as distance to withholding. Philosophical Studies, 178(3), 963-981.
Project: RG62/19 (NS)
Journal: Philosophical Studies
Abstract: How should we understand the relationship between binary belief and degree of belief? To answer this question, we should look to desire. Whatever relationship we think holds between desire and degree of desire should be used as our model for the relationship we think holds between belief and degree of belief. This parity pushes us towards an account that treats the binary attitudes as primary. But if we take binary beliefs as primary, we seem to face a serious problem. Binary beliefs are insufficiently discriminating. If we treat them as primary, we will lack the resources needed for fruitful theorizing. This problem can, I argue, be solved if we think of an agent’s degree of belief that p as reducible to her binary believing that p and the change in the apparent reasons that would be needed to get her to withhold.
ISSN: 0031-8116
DOI: 10.1007/s11098-020-01467-2
Rights: © 2020 Springer Nature B.V. All rights reserved.
Fulltext Permission: none
Fulltext Availability: No Fulltext
Appears in Collections:SoH Journal Articles

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