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|Title:||Industrial subsidy policy and the optimal level of specialization||Authors:||Dubey, Ram Sewak
|Keywords:||Social sciences::Economic development||Issue Date:||2020||Source:||Dubey, R. S. & Kang, M. (2020). Industrial subsidy policy and the optimal level of specialization. Economic Modelling, 91, 81-88. https://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.econmod.2020.05.025||Journal:||Economic Modelling||Abstract:||Despite compelling rationale based on the theory of comparative advantage for free trade, many countries adopt restrictive trade practices. In this paper we investigate this puzzle in a stylized two-country two-good Ricardian model of international trade. Governments can offer protection to domestic industries via industrial subsidy policy in this model. We prove the existence of a Nash equilibrium in the two-player game where industries choose the level of specialization. We determine the necessary conditions for complete specialization in (a) the free-trade regime; and (b) the protectionist regime implemented through industrial subsidy policy. Our results show that if the government intends to promote complete specialization, then a high degree of comparative advantage and a large elasticity of substitution between export and import goods are required. Empirical evidence on these two parameters indicate that complete specialization is unlikely to survive in the protectionist regime.||URI:||https://hdl.handle.net/10356/155143||ISSN:||0264-9993||DOI:||10.1016/j.econmod.2020.05.025||Rights:||© 2020 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.||Fulltext Permission:||none||Fulltext Availability:||No Fulltext|
|Appears in Collections:||SSS Journal Articles|
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