Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10356/155579
Title: Will you cross the threshold for me? Generic side-channel assisted chosen-ciphertext attacks on NTRU-based KEMs
Authors: Ravi, Prasanna
Ezerman, Martianus Frederic
Bhasin, Shivam
Chattopadhyay, Anupam
Sinha Roy, Sujoy
Keywords: Science::Mathematics::Discrete mathematics::Cryptography
Issue Date: 2022
Source: Ravi, P., Ezerman, M. F., Bhasin, S., Chattopadhyay, A. & Sinha Roy, S. (2022). Will you cross the threshold for me? Generic side-channel assisted chosen-ciphertext attacks on NTRU-based KEMs. IACR Transactions On Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems, 2022(1), 722-761. https://dx.doi.org/10.46586/tches.v2022.i1.722-761
Journal: IACR Transactions on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems 
Abstract: In this work, we propose generic and novel side-channel assisted chosenciphertext attacks on NTRU-based key encapsulation mechanisms (KEMs). These KEMs are IND-CCA secure, that is, they are secure in the chosen-ciphertext model. Our attacks involve the construction of malformed ciphertexts. When decapsulated by the target device, these ciphertexts ensure that a targeted intermediate variable becomes very closely related to the secret key. An attacker, who can obtain information about the secret-dependent variable through side-channels, can subsequently recover the full secret key. We propose several novel CCAs which can be carried through by using side-channel leakage from the decapsulation procedure. The attacks instantiate three different types of oracles, namely a plaintext-checking oracle, a decryptionfailure oracle, and a full-decryption oracle, and are applicable to two NTRU-based schemes, which are NTRU and NTRU Prime. The two schemes are candidates in the ongoing NIST standardization process for post-quantum cryptography. We perform experimental validation of the attacks on optimized and unprotected implementations of NTRU-based schemes, taken from the open-source pqm4 library, using the EM-based side-channel on the 32-bit ARM Cortex-M4 microcontroller. All of our proposed attacks are capable of recovering the full secret key in only a few thousand chosen ciphertext queries on all parameter sets of NTRU and NTRU Prime. Our attacks, therefore, stress on the need for concrete side-channel protection strategies for NTRUbased KEMs.
URI: https://hdl.handle.net/10356/155579
ISSN: 2569-2925
DOI: 10.46586/tches.v2022.i1.722-761
Rights: © 2021 Prasanna Ravi, Martianus Frederic Ezerman, Shivam Bhasin, Anupam Chattopadhyay, Sujoy Sinha Roy. This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License.
Fulltext Permission: open
Fulltext Availability: With Fulltext
Appears in Collections:SCSE Journal Articles
SPMS Journal Articles
TL Journal Articles

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