Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10356/157043
Full metadata record
DC FieldValueLanguage
dc.contributor.authorStepien, Rafal K.en_US
dc.date.accessioned2022-05-01T04:18:40Z-
dc.date.available2022-05-01T04:18:40Z-
dc.date.issued2021-
dc.identifier.citationStepien, R. K. (2021). Substantialism, essentialism, emptiness: buddhist critiques of ontology. Journal of Indian Philosophy, 49(5), 871-893. https://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10781-021-09483-0en_US
dc.identifier.issn0022-1791en_US
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/10356/157043-
dc.description.abstractThis article seeks to introduce a greater degree of precision into our understanding of Madhyamaka Buddhist ontological non-foundationalism, focussing specifically on the Madhyamaka founder Nāgārjuna (c. 150–250 CE). It distinguishes four senses of what the ‘foundation’ whose existence Mādhyamikas deny means; that is, (1) as ‘something that stands under or grounds things’ (a position known as generic substantialism); (2) as ‘a particular kind of basic entity’ (specific substantialism); (3) as ‘an individual essence (a haecceity or thisness of that object) by means of which it is identical to that very object, to itself’ (modal essentialism); and (4) as ‘an essence in the absence of which an object could be of a radically different kind or sort of object than it in fact is’ (sortal essentialism). It then proceeds to delineate the Madhyamaka refutation of the specific substantialist position in terms of its argued denial of dharma as basic entity; of generic substantialism and modal essentialism in terms of its argued denial of svabhāva as both foundation for and essence of putative entities; and of sortal essentialism in terms of its argued denial of essentialist conceptions of conceptual thought (vikalpa), mental construction (prapañca), and in short the entire domain of ratiocination (kalpanā), by means of its notion of conceptual imputation (prajñaptir upādāya)—a denial strictly speaking ontological, but of what are putative epistemic entities. The final portion of the article explains the relationship of ontological to other forms of non-foundationalism according to Madhyamaka.en_US
dc.language.isoenen_US
dc.relation.ispartofJournal of Indian Philosophyen_US
dc.rights© 2021 The Author(s), under exclusive licence to Springer Nature B.V. All rights reserved. This paper was published in Journal of Indian Philosophy and is made available with permission of The Author(s).en_US
dc.subjectHumanities::Philosophyen_US
dc.titleSubstantialism, essentialism, emptiness: buddhist critiques of ontologyen_US
dc.typeJournal Articleen
dc.contributor.schoolS. Rajaratnam School of International Studiesen_US
dc.identifier.doi10.1007/s10781-021-09483-0-
dc.description.versionSubmitted/Accepted versionen_US
dc.identifier.scopus2-s2.0-85115690881-
dc.identifier.issue5en_US
dc.identifier.volume49en_US
dc.identifier.spage871en_US
dc.identifier.epage893en_US
dc.subject.keywordsSubstantialismen_US
dc.subject.keywordsEssentialismen_US
item.grantfulltextopen-
item.fulltextWith Fulltext-
Appears in Collections:RSIS Journal Articles
Files in This Item:
File Description SizeFormat 
Substantialism essentialism emptiness buddhist critiques of ontology.pdf244.4 kBAdobe PDFView/Open

Page view(s)

59
Updated on Feb 2, 2023

Download(s)

2
Updated on Feb 2, 2023

Google ScholarTM

Check

Altmetric


Plumx

Items in DR-NTU are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.