Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10356/160045
Title: Does CEO power affect the association between CEO compensation and tangible assets impairments?
Authors: Lee, Kin-Wai
Lee, Cheng-Few
Yeo, Gillian Hian Heng
Keywords: Business::Accounting
Issue Date: 2021
Source: Lee, K., Lee, C. & Yeo, G. H. H. (2021). Does CEO power affect the association between CEO compensation and tangible assets impairments?. Review of Pacific Basin Financial Markets and Policies, 24(1), 2150005-1-2150005-26. https://dx.doi.org/10.1142/S0219091521500053
Journal: Review of Pacific Basin Financial Markets and Policies
Abstract: This paper examines the association between CEO compensation and tangible long-lived assets impairment. We find that the level of CEO compensation is negatively associated with the tangible long-lived assets impairment charges. We also document that in firms with CEOs who have more decision-making power, the negative association between CEO compensation and tangible long-lived assets impairment charges is mitigated. Specifically, the negative association between CEO compensation and tangible long-lived assets impairment charges is less pronounced (1) when CEO chairs the board, (2) when CEO is the founder of the firm, (3) when the CEO is involved in the director selection process, and (4) when overall board independence is low.
URI: https://hdl.handle.net/10356/160045
ISSN: 0219-0915
DOI: 10.1142/S0219091521500053
Schools: Nanyang Business School 
Rights: © World Scientific Publishing Co. and Center for Pacific Basin Business, Economics and Finance Research. All rights reserved.
Fulltext Permission: none
Fulltext Availability: No Fulltext
Appears in Collections:NBS Journal Articles

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