Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10356/160763
Title: Remanufacturing authorization strategy for an original equipment manufacturer-contract manufacturer supply chain: cooperation or competition?
Authors: Zhou, Qin
Meng, Chao
Yuen, Kum Fai
Sheu, Jiuh-Biing
Keywords: Business::Marketing
Issue Date: 2021
Source: Zhou, Q., Meng, C., Yuen, K. F. & Sheu, J. (2021). Remanufacturing authorization strategy for an original equipment manufacturer-contract manufacturer supply chain: cooperation or competition?. International Journal of Production Economics, 240, 108238-. https://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ijpe.2021.108238
Journal: International Journal of Production Economics
Abstract: Due to the supply chain globalization, technology-oriented original equipment manufacturers are focusing on their core competencies by outsourcing the production to contract manufacturers. Many contract manufacturers also engage in remanufacturing and provide high quality remanufactured products in the market posing competition to the new products. This paper considers a supply chain with an original equipment manufacturer and a contract manufacturer. The contract manufacturer produces new products for the original equipment manufacturer and may compete with the original equipment manufacturer by producing and selling remanufactured products. The original equipment manufacturer can determine whether to authorize the contract manufacturer's remanufacturing. This paper investigates the wholesale price and retail price decisions for the new product and the conditions under which an authorization agreement can be reached between the two parties. In the analysis, two wholesale price settings are considered, the exogenous wholesale and endogenous wholesale price settings. In addition, three authorization decision bargaining scenarios are examined, including the original equipment manufacturer determining the authorization fee, the contract manufacturer determining the authorization fee, and two parties negotiating the authorization fee, to analyze the authorization cooperation outcomes via the generalized Nash bargaining framework. The results show that when the contract manufacturer determines the authorization fee, an authorization cooperation can never be reached whether in the exogenous or endogenous wholesale price setting. The original equipment manufacturer is more likely to set an authorization fee that leads to an authorization cooperation between the original equipment manufacturer and the contract manufacturer, especially when the contract manufacturer collects and remanufactures all the used products. Multiple factors influencing authorization cooperation decision are investigated, including the exogenous and endogenous wholesale price, production cost of new and remanufactured products, bargaining power of the two parties, and consumers' preference for remanufactured products.
URI: https://hdl.handle.net/10356/160763
ISSN: 0925-5273
DOI: 10.1016/j.ijpe.2021.108238
Schools: School of Civil and Environmental Engineering 
Rights: © 2021 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
Fulltext Permission: none
Fulltext Availability: No Fulltext
Appears in Collections:CEE Journal Articles

SCOPUSTM   
Citations 20

24
Updated on Sep 30, 2023

Web of ScienceTM
Citations 20

20
Updated on Sep 27, 2023

Page view(s)

34
Updated on Sep 30, 2023

Google ScholarTM

Check

Altmetric


Plumx

Items in DR-NTU are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.