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|Title:||The epistemic significance of religious disagreements: cases of unconfirmed superiority disagreements||Authors:||Choo, Frederick Wen Yeong||Keywords:||Humanities::Philosophy||Issue Date:||2021||Source:||Choo, F. W. Y. (2021). The epistemic significance of religious disagreements: cases of unconfirmed superiority disagreements. Topoi, 40(5), 1139-1147. https://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11245-018-9599-4||Journal:||Topoi||Abstract:||Religious disagreements are widespread. Some philosophers have argued that religious disagreements call for religious skepticism, or a revision of one’s religious beliefs. In order to figure out the epistemic significance of religious disagreements, two questions need to be answered. First, what kind of disagreements are religious disagreements? Second, how should one respond to such disagreements? In this paper, I argue that many religious disagreements are cases of unconfirmed superiority disagreements, where parties have good reason to think they are not epistemic peers, yet they lack good reason to determine who is superior. Such disagreements have been left relatively unexplored. I then argue that in cases of unconfirmed superiority disagreements, disputants can remain relatively steadfast in holding to their beliefs. Hence, we can remain relatively steadfast in our beliefs in such cases of religious disagreements.||URI:||https://hdl.handle.net/10356/161526||ISSN:||0167-7411||DOI:||10.1007/s11245-018-9599-4||Schools:||School of Humanities||Rights:||© 2018 Springer Nature B.V. All rights reserved.||Fulltext Permission:||none||Fulltext Availability:||No Fulltext|
|Appears in Collections:||SoH Journal Articles|
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