Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10356/163369
Title: Distributed Nash equilibrium seeking: continuous-time control-theoretic approaches
Authors: Hu, Guoqiang
Pang, Yipeng
Sun, Chao
Hong, Yiguang
Keywords: Engineering::Electrical and electronic engineering
Issue Date: 2022
Source: Hu, G., Pang, Y., Sun, C. & Hong, Y. (2022). Distributed Nash equilibrium seeking: continuous-time control-theoretic approaches. IEEE Control Systems, 42(4), 68-86. https://dx.doi.org/10.1109/MCS.2022.3171479
Project: I1901E0046 
RG180/17(2017-T1-002–158)
Journal: IEEE Control Systems
Abstract: Game theory, which studies the cooperation and conflict among multiple rational decision makers, called players, can be utilized to analyze a large class of engineering systems (for example, wireless communication networks and smart grids). A game usually consists of three components: the players; the players' actions; and their objective functions, which the players try to either maximize (in which case the objective function is known as a utility or payoff function) or minimize (in which case the objective function is referred to as a cost or loss function). In general, the players' objective functions are dependent on other players' actions, which lead to the coupling between the players' actions in the decision-making process. This article is concerned with static games, where the order of the players' decisions is not important (see 'Summary').
URI: https://hdl.handle.net/10356/163369
ISSN: 1066-033X
DOI: 10.1109/MCS.2022.3171479
Schools: School of Electrical and Electronic Engineering 
Rights: © 2022 IEEE. All rights reserved.
Fulltext Permission: none
Fulltext Availability: No Fulltext
Appears in Collections:EEE Journal Articles

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