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Title: A double auction mechanism for resource allocation in coded vehicular edge computing
Authors: Ng, Jer Shyuan
Lim, Bryan Wei Yang
Xiong, Zehui
Niyato, Dusit
Leung, Cyril
Miao, Chunyan
Keywords: Engineering::Computer science and engineering
Issue Date: 2021
Source: Ng, J. S., Lim, B. W. Y., Xiong, Z., Niyato, D., Leung, C. & Miao, C. (2021). A double auction mechanism for resource allocation in coded vehicular edge computing. IEEE Transactions On Vehicular Technology, 71(2), 1832-1845.
Project: AISG2-RP-2020-019
M4082187 (4080)
SUTD-ZJU (VP) 202102
Journal: IEEE Transactions on Vehicular Technology
Abstract: The development of smart vehicles and rich cloud services have led to the emergence of vehicular edge computing. To perform the distributed computation tasks efficiently, Coded Distributed Computing (CDC) was proposed to reduce communication costs and mitigate the straggler effects through the use of coding techniques. In this paper, we propose a double auction mechanism to allocate the resources of the edge servers to the vehicles in order to complete the CDC tasks. Specifically, the vehicles use the PolyDot codes to manage the tradeoff between communication costs and recovery threshold. Given the requirements of various vehicles, the double auction mechanism matches the edge servers with the required resources to the vehicles. Besides, the double auction mechanism also determines the prices that the vehicles need to pay for the resources of the edge servers. The analyses show that the double auction mechanism satisfies the properties of individual rationality, incentive compatibility and budget-balance. From the simulation, the utility of auctioneer increases when the number of vehicles and edge servers increases.
ISSN: 0018-9545
DOI: 10.1109/TVT.2021.3131395
Schools: School of Computer Science and Engineering 
Research Centres: Alibaba-NTU Joint Research Institute
Joint NTU-UBC Research Centre of Excellence in Active Living for the Elderly (LILY) 
Rights: © 2021 IEEE. All rights reserved.
Fulltext Permission: none
Fulltext Availability: No Fulltext
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