Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
Title: A game-based incentive-driven offloading framework for dispersed computing
Authors: Wu, Hongjia
Nie, Jiangtian
Xiong, Zehui
Cai, Zhiping
Zhou, Tongqing
Yuen, Chau
Niyato, Dusit
Keywords: Engineering::Computer science and engineering
Issue Date: 2023
Source: Wu, H., Nie, J., Xiong, Z., Cai, Z., Zhou, T., Yuen, C. & Niyato, D. (2023). A game-based incentive-driven offloading framework for dispersed computing. IEEE Transactions On Communications, 71(7), 4034-4049.
Project: A19D6a0053 
SUTD SRG-ISTD-2021-165 
SUTD-ZJU (VP) 202102 
SKI 20210204
Journal: IEEE Transactions on Communications
Abstract: The popularization of smart Internet of Things (IoT) devices has facilitated the development of fog/edge computing. However, these infrastructure-based service paradigms may fail to complete tasks successfully due to computation and communication overload, or damage in challenging scenarios such as disasters or traffic jams. Noticing that a crowd of devices with considerable idle resources could be available, we investigate the problems of addressing the computation and communication unavailability with peer assistance in this work. To this end, we propose a dispersed service framework for resource-exhausted scenarios that adaptively offloads users' data to available network computation points. However, the users may not be able to achieve the offloading due to geographical hindrances. Consequently, the relay is introduced as a bridge for data offloading between the users and the network computation points. Furthermore, a game-based incentive-driven offloading mechanism is designed by analyzing and balancing the cost and gain factors of three main entities (users, relays, and network computation points). Considering the interactions among the entities, a two-level Stackelberg game is established for efficiently allocating potential computation resource, as well as balancing the utility conflicts due to the data offloading. Given the hierarchical interaction structure, the upper level game involves network computation points as followers and the relay as a leader, while the lower level game includes the relay as a follower and users as leaders. Moreover, to facilitate applicability in large-scale scenarios with multiple relays, we decompose multiple relays into multiple single relay problems using a tripartite matching strategy that assigns appropriate relays to users and network computation points. The simulation results demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed game-based incentive-driven mechanism and show that it outperforms the baselines in terms of the overall utilities of the involved entities and the average energy consumption of users.
ISSN: 0090-6778
DOI: 10.1109/TCOMM.2023.3266833
Schools: School of Computer Science and Engineering 
School of Electrical and Electronic Engineering 
Rights: © 2023 IEEE. All rights reserved.
Fulltext Permission: none
Fulltext Availability: No Fulltext
Appears in Collections:SCSE Journal Articles

Citations 50

Updated on Jul 18, 2024

Page view(s)

Updated on Jul 24, 2024

Google ScholarTM




Items in DR-NTU are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.