Assessing the role of third parties in minilateral effectiveness: the case of the Six-Party Talks

Abstract

This dissertation explores the effectiveness of minilateral arrangements, specifically focusing on instances such as the Six-Party Talks (SPT) addressing the North Korean nuclear crisis. Despite the purported advantages of minilaterals—smaller size and informality—their effectiveness varies, as exemplified by successes like the Bosnia Contact Group and the Iran denuclearisation talks which led to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action agreement, and failures such as the Kosovo Contact Group. This dissertation has thus sought to answer the following: What explains the variation in minilateral effectiveness? The existing literature offered limited explanatory power but alluded to the importance of examining how the ‘other’ parties in a minilateral may contribute to its effectiveness. Specifically, the idea that a large degree of a minilateral’s effectiveness lies in its constituent members’ behaviours and their willingness to wield their influence highlighted the importance of looking at the individual members. Drawing parallels between the structure of security minilaterals and multiparty mediation situations, my central argument is rooted in the concept of multiparty mediation. Specifically, I posit that the third parties (or the ‘others’) have a considerable influence on the effectiveness of minilaterals due to their mediative powers. The within-case analysis of the SPT has provided evidence of the influential role of third parties. Through their different mediative powers, the third parties (i.e. China, South Korea, Japan, and Russia) influenced the disputants and contributed to the SPT’s varying effectiveness, i.e. forging of agreements, resolution of stalemates, or breakdown of negotiations. More specifically, the use of expert knowledge power helped persuade disputants to adjust their demands thereby facilitating agreements and resolving stalemates. Reward power was essential for getting disputants to come to an agreement and to remain engaged in negotiations while coercive power was used to punish disputants for undesirable behaviour. Network power was also used to increase pressure on North Korea to change its behaviour and to restrain US hostility. The findings of the SPT case suggest that the role of the third parties in minilaterals should not be overlooked as these parties' choices and behaviours have a significant impact on the minilateral process. This research has made a contribution to the advancement of our understanding of minilateral effectiveness.