Intelligence failure in U.S. counterterrorism

Abstract

The main goal of this dissertation is to test the “Connect the Dots” theory of intelligence failure in cases of terrorist attacks. This theory maintains that derogatory information about terrorist suspects usually exists within government channels, but for a variety of reasons is not correlated in time to discover/disrupt a terrorist plot. This idea falls within the more prominent “reformist” school of intelligence failure that maintains that correcting important structural (ie bureaucratic/organizational) issues within the intelligence community is the key to preventing future intelligence failures in terrorist attacks. The dissertation also tests a competing theory within the traditionalist school of intelligence failure, the idea that terrorism presents a unique intelligence challenge (hard target) for intelligence warning systems. In order to test these two theories, I examine three cases to determine whether there were critical pieces of information (dots) existing in government channels that could have been connected to discover the terrorist plot. Conversely, I examine whether these attacks were conducted in such a way to make it very unlikely to have been discovered by the intelligence community. One case is a state-sponsored terrorist attack (Khobar Towers), another planned by al-Qaeda core leadership (USS Cole), and the last is an insider attack inspired by AQAP (Naval Air Station Pensacola Florida). I conclude the Connect the Dots theory best explains the failure to discover the USS Cole Attack and the Pensacola Shooting, even though elements of the Hard Target theory were contributing factors to the intelligence challenge. In the case of the Khobar Towers attack, the data is stronger in support of the Hard Target theory. This is significant because it supports the conclusion that more can be done in the analytical and information sharing domains to prevent al-Qaeda and insider threat attacks, while supporting the idea that state-sponsored attacks will be less likely to have data available to connect prior to an attack due to the higher degree of professionalism and advanced operational security resources available to government intelligence services supporting the attack planning.