Paradox-free desire satisfaction theory

Abstract

I argue that we can reconcile the simplest version of a desire satisfaction theory of well-being with certain problem cases called "desire satisfaction paradoxes". These cases involve the satisfaction of token desires that seem to imply a contradiction or paradox. My strategy involves formulating the desire satisfaction theory that I have in mind in light of a theory of desire which holds that desire is an affective propositional attitude. If desire is affective, I argue that it places an additional condition on the persistence of a token desire that constrains when the desire is satisfied. It implies therefore that a desire is not satisfied at any time that its object obtains. If desire is a propositional attitude and given a certain view of propositional attitudes, there are structural constraints on what qualifies as a propositional attitude. It implies therefore that some alleged desires are not desires after all and so they are in no position to be satisfied or frustrated. Thus following these constraints, I argue that a paradox-free desire satisfaction theory is possible. In this thesis, I focus especially on the paradoxical cases of Fred Feldman, Ethan Jerzak, Ben Bradley, and Ben Davies.