Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
https://hdl.handle.net/10356/181895
Full metadata record
DC Field | Value | Language |
---|---|---|
dc.contributor.author | Doe, Daniel Mawunyo | en_US |
dc.contributor.author | Li, Jing | en_US |
dc.contributor.author | Niyato, Dusit | en_US |
dc.contributor.author | Hu, Yuqing | en_US |
dc.contributor.author | Li, Jun | en_US |
dc.contributor.author | Gao, Zhen | en_US |
dc.contributor.author | Zhang, Xiao-Ping | en_US |
dc.contributor.author | Han, Zhu | en_US |
dc.date.accessioned | 2024-12-30T01:35:46Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2024-12-30T01:35:46Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 2024 | - |
dc.identifier.citation | Doe, D. M., Li, J., Niyato, D., Hu, Y., Li, J., Gao, Z., Zhang, X. & Han, Z. (2024). Harnessing Tullock contests and signaling games: a novel weight assignment strategy for Ethereum 2.0. IEEE Open Journal of the Communications Society, 5, 5782-5798. https://dx.doi.org/10.1109/OJCOMS.2024.3455769 | en_US |
dc.identifier.issn | 2644-125X | en_US |
dc.identifier.uri | https://hdl.handle.net/10356/181895 | - |
dc.description.abstract | In this paper, we address key challenges in Proof-of-Stake (PoS) blockchains, with a particular focus on Ethereum 2.0. We introduce an innovative mechanism that combines Tullock contests and signaling games to optimize weight assignments based on security deposits from heterogeneous nodes. While Tullock contests motivate participants to allocate resources for potential rewards, signaling games enable efficient information transfer, thereby enriching decision-making. This approach enhances network security, efficiency, and resilience by incentivizing resource investment and facilitating effective information exchange. Our framework significantly outperforms existing methods, achieving a 45.43% increase in blockchain utility and a 47.92% rise in node utility. Additionally, it yields marked improvements in user participation rates (26.89 - 32.21%) and service coverage (24 - 29.54%), and also proves to be resilient against attacks from selfish nodes. | en_US |
dc.language.iso | en | en_US |
dc.relation.ispartof | IEEE Open Journal of the Communications Society | en_US |
dc.rights | © 2024 The Authors. This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 License. | en_US |
dc.subject | Computer and Information Science | en_US |
dc.title | Harnessing Tullock contests and signaling games: a novel weight assignment strategy for Ethereum 2.0 | en_US |
dc.type | Journal Article | en |
dc.contributor.school | College of Computing and Data Science | en_US |
dc.identifier.doi | 10.1109/OJCOMS.2024.3455769 | - |
dc.description.version | Published version | en_US |
dc.identifier.scopus | 2-s2.0-85203538429 | - |
dc.identifier.volume | 5 | en_US |
dc.identifier.spage | 5782 | en_US |
dc.identifier.epage | 5798 | en_US |
dc.subject.keywords | Blockchain | en_US |
dc.subject.keywords | Security deposit | en_US |
dc.description.acknowledgement | This work was supported in part by the National Key Research and Development Project of China under Grant 2022YFE0111900; in part by NSF under Grant CNS-2107216, Grant CNS-2128368, Grant CMMI-2222810, and Grant ECCS-2302469; in part by the U.S. Department of Transportation; in part by Toyota; in part by Amazon; and in part by the Japan Science and Technology Agency (JST) Adopting Sustainable Partnerships for Innovative Research Ecosystem (ASPIRE) under Grant JPMJAP2326. | en_US |
item.fulltext | With Fulltext | - |
item.grantfulltext | open | - |
Appears in Collections: | CCDS Journal Articles |
Files in This Item:
File | Description | Size | Format | |
---|---|---|---|---|
10668813.pdf | 4.85 MB | Adobe PDF | View/Open |
Page view(s)
46
Updated on Feb 10, 2025
Download(s)
2
Updated on Feb 10, 2025
Google ScholarTM
Check
Altmetric
Items in DR-NTU are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.