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Title: Resolving the third Korean nuclear crisis : lessons from diplomatic engagement.
Authors: Koh, Swee Lean.
Keywords: DRNTU::Social sciences::Military and naval science::Strategy
Issue Date: 2008
Abstract: On 9th October 2006, North Korea shocked the world with its first nuclear test, literally igniting the Third Korean nuclear crisis. Contrary to many expectations. North Korea did not escalate but agreed to negotiate, bringing forth the historic 13-February-2007 Agreement after the Six-Party Talks and affirmed on 3rd October 2007, obliging North Korea to denuclearize in exchange for energy aid and political concessions. As the nuclear weapons program was conceived for mainly security reasons, why North Korea would decide to denuclearize despite facing continued security threats to its very survival remained enigmatic. Despite the current deadlock which plagued the denuclearization process, this paper argues, using the proposed STEP framework of analysis, that regime survival was North Korea's national goal and it would be achieved ultimately through denuclearization, for not just economic but also political imperatives. On the other hand, security and technology factors explored could not adequately explain the successful negotiated outcome from the multilateral dialogue. Understanding North Korea"s motivations behind its decision to rollback its nuclear weapons program in 2007 might serve as a useful reference for future denuclearization cases.
Description: 36 p.
Fulltext Permission: restricted
Fulltext Availability: With Fulltext
Appears in Collections:RSIS Theses

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