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Title: Allison wonderland revisited : explaining Israel's intelligence failure in October 1973.
Authors: Lim, James Chong Beng.
Keywords: DRNTU::Social sciences::Military and naval science::Strategy::Asia
Issue Date: 1999
Abstract: The subject of intelligence in the 1973 Arab-Israeli war is one that has been extensively studied. This thesis differs from previous studies in its use of the conceptual models first introduced by Graham T. Allison in Essence of Decision as an analytic framework for the study of Israel's intelligence failure in October 1973, i.e. to answer the question why, up to the very day that war broke out, Israel's Military Intelligence repeatedly produced the estimate that Egypt and Syria were unlikely to launch a military attack on Israel, in spite of the availability of overwhelming evidence which indicated such a possibility.
Fulltext Permission: restricted
Fulltext Availability: With Fulltext
Appears in Collections:RSIS Theses

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