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Title: Paradox of capitalist game rules : coexistence of ownership concentration and employment volatility
Authors: Pan, Rongfang
Keywords: DRNTU::Social sciences
Issue Date: 2011
Abstract: Despite the significance of institutional complementarity in understanding business strategies and activities among most industrialized countries, some Asian economies have nevertheless exhibited pronounced conflicting arrangements particularly between concentrated corporate ownership structure and volatile labour markets. This paper argues that non-democratic regimes offer a better justification for this non-complementary game rules than other political institutions such as electoral system and partisanship; and heavy reliance on foreign direct investment acts as a catalyst to the mechanism. Statistical analysis testing individual and combined effects of the two factors, as well as qualitative assessments of three "Asian Tigers" provide robust and consistent evidence to the argument. Empirically, the Asian model may be suggestive to the ongoing debate about the future of capitalism triggered by the global financial crisis.
Description: 63 p.
Rights: Nanyang Technological University
Fulltext Permission: restricted
Fulltext Availability: With Fulltext
Appears in Collections:RSIS Theses

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