China's collaboration with IndoChina countries in hydropower development in the Mekong region - how far can it go?

Abstract

Hydropower development and infrastructure building to facilitate regional power trade has been a key investment feature of the Greater Mekong Subregion (GMS) programme since 1990s. These projects are generating much controversy and dilemma for states and decision makers. On the one hand,they enhance regional and economic cooperation by producing and making available for trading, a commonly desired economic good - electricity. On the other hand, they breed potential conflicts as economic losses, devastating impacts on the environment, and hardship on large number of communities are expected to be borne unequally amongst riparian states - those furthest from the Mekong river source in the lower basin are likely to bear more negative consequences than their upstream neighbours. Rather than attempting to assess costs-benefits more rigorously and bandwagon to slow down China's progress in building dams upstream, the irony is that today, Indochina governments in the lower basin of the river and more investors have rushed to propose and commit to host new projects. China being the host to the source of the Lancang-Mekong river has not only unilaterally planned to build up to a total of eight dams on its part of the upper mainstream of the river, but is also collaborating and investing to build dams in downstream riparian states of Laos and Cambodia. How far can China proceed in implementing its plan and collaborations with these Indochina countries in hydropower development in the Mekong region?