Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
Title: Punishment and leadership in public goods game.
Authors: Wang, Sijia.
Zhang, Zhihui.
Li, Qianli.
Keywords: DRNTU::Humanities
Issue Date: 2013
Abstract: To study the effect of centralized authority in the provision of public goods game, this paper compares 8 treatments by examining: (i) the differences between exogenous leadership and endogenous leadership, (ii) given restricted/free power, whether a leader will abuse power, (iii) the voting pattern in leader selection, and (iv) the impact by introducing sequence in decision making. The experimental results are: (i) There is no significant difference between endogenous and exogenous leadership on the overall contribution level, while the existence of endogenous leadership helps to coordinate members’ contribution in a public goods game (ii) If power is restricted, leaders tend to behave in accordance with self-compliance effect; however, power is likely to be abused when leaders are given the freedom of punishing others, (iii) Group members have a propensity to select the most generous person to be a leader and (iv) In sequential experiment, Pareto efficient optimum is achieved.
Rights: Nanyang Technological University
Fulltext Permission: restricted
Fulltext Availability: With Fulltext
Appears in Collections:HSS Student Reports (FYP/IA/PA/PI)

Files in This Item:
File Description SizeFormat 
  Restricted Access
Final Year Project Report838.09 kBAdobe PDFView/Open

Page view(s) 50

Updated on Feb 28, 2021

Download(s) 50

Updated on Feb 28, 2021

Google ScholarTM


Items in DR-NTU are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.