The network of Islamist terrorists in Indonesia and its centre of gravity: examining Indonesia's counterterrorism strategy, 2002 - 2010.

Abstract

Indonesia was acknowledged for its numerous successes in the counterterrorism efforts conducted by the government since the first Bali bombing of 2002. It successfully disrupted the Islamist terrorist network, captured the key leaders and members of the network, and clamped down on the development of the network. However, Indonesia still faced a paradoxical situation that saw the strengthening of the Islamist terrorist network and the proliferation of its members, rather than a decline in terrorist activities. This study utilizes the Clausewitz's concept of Centre of Gravity (COG) to analyse why the government's determined efforts cannot ignore the fact that the country continues to be plagued by the threat of terrorism. This study finds that the COG of the Indonesian Islamist terrorist is the ideology of Salafi Jihad. The ideology performs the role of the centripetal force that holds the network together. It also draws recruits and support from various sources to the network, enabling the network to execute acts of terrorism. In addition, it encourages the terrorists to continuously perpetrate such acts. As the COG of the Islamist terrorist network, the ideological values of Salafi Jihad, according to Clausewitz's propositions, have then to be affected in order to significantly emasculate the Islamist terrorists. Investigating the Indonesian government counterterrorism strategy from 2002, after the First Bali Bombing, to 2010, this study finds that the government's counterterrorism strategy was mainly directed to hit the mobilizing agents, capture the perpetrators, and penalize these individuals. This study argues that these efforts did not disrupt the COG of the terrorist network, which is the ideology of Salafi Jihad. This largely explains why the government failed to eradicate the Indonesian Islamist terrorist threats completely. In other words, it was the failure of the government's counterterrorism strategy in affecting the COG of the terrorist network that prevented it from eradicating the Indonesian Islamist terrorist threats comprehensively.