Bystander or intervener: what determines U.S. decision on humanitarian intervention?

Abstract

Humanitarian intervention has always been an interesting but controversial

phenomenon in international relations and the debate around this issue

prevails. Different theories have provided different standards to interpret

states' occasional commitment in humanitarian interventions. Moreover, by the

end of Cold War, the international security environment has changed

fundamentally along with the collapse of the bipolar system and the United

States has asserted a new role in international affairs. In the Post-Cold War era,

the U.S. had been involved in five different conflicts related to humanitarian

issues: Somalia {1992-1993), Haiti {1994-1995), Bosnia {1995-2004), Kosovo

{1999-present) and Libya {2011). However, while intervening to protect lives in

Somalia and Libya, Washington ignored crises in Rwanda, Yemen and Syria.

What determines the U.S.'s decision in humanitarian intervention? To answer

this question, this paper will take a realist perspective, arguing that the US

decision concerning humanitarian intervention is motivated by national

interests. To discuss further, the article will discuss two key variables of

national interests, namely military alliance and low cost military plan, and test

their validity in constructing American humanitarian intervention decisions

accordingly. Case studies of Libya and Syria will be illustrated to support my

findings.