Industrial tariff reduction and workers' rights: a process-tracing approach

Abstract

The Non-Agricultural Market Access (NAMA) in the World Trade Organization's

(WTO) Doha Round intends to reduce tariffs and liberalize trade of industrial or

manufactured goods. Based on the claim that trade enhances welfare, this dissertation aims

to explore and explain why workers will suffer the consequences of industrial tariff reduction

through NAMA.

At first glance, NAMA or the reduction of industrial tariffs seems to have no impact

on workers' rights. Looking closer, the industrial tariff reduction will lower labor standards

due to competitive pressure from cheap imports and export markets. This triggers a 'race to

the bottom' which allows countries to compete and maintain the market share for their

products. While this is also evident in regional and bilateral trade agreements (RBTAs) with

labor provisions, it is more so in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Free

Trade Agreement (AFTA) which has no labor provisions. The absence of enforceable

complaint mechanisms in case of labor violations and the limited geographic coverage of

RBTAs only hamper the enforcement of workers' rights. These arguments are valid and

indicate the need for a multilateral agreement on workers' rights in the WTO.

A process-tracing approach that explores an in -depth causal relationship between

NAMA and workers' rights is used to identify the factors leading to undercutting workers'

rights. The threat of trade sanctions for violating workers' rights is crucial if workers' rights

are to be enforced in the multilateral trading system. By examining other factors and issues

in the causal relationship, the dissertation concludes that the absence of a multilateral

agreement on workers' rights is the main reason why NAMA will undercut workers' rights in

developing countries.