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|Title:||What's next? The effects of economic sanctions on postsanction trade||Authors:||Ingold, Emanuel||Keywords:||DRNTU::Business::International business::Economic sanction||Issue Date:||2014||Abstract:||This study investigates the effects of economic sanctions on postsanction trade patterns. This analys is is couched with the argument that postsanction trade patterns arc fundamentally different from prcsanction patterns. By developing a new theoretical framework , the study analyses the policy options of t he three types of actors involved in a sanction regime: the sender, the target, and the third party states. The policies employed by these actors have led to a change of trade patterns from the prcsanction to the postsanction period. This study argues that this change is brought about by the stickiness of newly established trade patterns during the sanction period, which remained in place thereafter; the convergence of geographically close third party states and the target; and the loss of confidence of target states in prcsanction trade partners that restrict their exchanges during a sanction regime. The empirical analysis evaluates the extent by which trade patterns arc different in the postsanction period as compared to the prcsanction period and whether sanctions are the main reason for this change. Additionally, the influence of other variables such as multilateralism, duration of the sanction episode, and the cost for the target is also assessed. The hypotheses arc tested in a GLS regression model whereby the panel data would cover all sanction episodes that arc longer than three years between 1965 and 2004. The statistical analysis in this study supports the arguments that sanctions are the main causal factor leading to a change of trade patterns in t he postsanction period as compared to the prcsanction period, whereas additional variables do not seem to have a large influence on this change. Keywords: Postsanction Trade, Effects of Sanctions. Economic Statecraft||URI:||http://hdl.handle.net/10356/65151||Fulltext Permission:||restricted||Fulltext Availability:||With Fulltext|
|Appears in Collections:||RSIS Theses|
checked on Sep 22, 2020
checked on Sep 22, 2020
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