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Title: Do higher politician salaries reduce corruption and improve governance?
Authors: Chin, Hong Xiang
Low, Guo Quan
Wang, Yiwei
Keywords: DRNTU::Social sciences
Issue Date: 2016
Abstract: Do higher politician salaries reduce corruption and improve governance? Previous empirical studies focusing on specific countries have suggested conflicting conclusions, while no studies to date has examined a panel analysis of this relation across countries and over time. Our paper addresses this gap by gathering a novel primary dataset of 963 top politician and cabinet minister salaries through official and non-official sources, which spans across 144 countries from the period of 1873 to 2015. Based on our results, we find that (1) in non-democracies, (a) higher salaries of top politicians are associated with higher corruption and worse governance, while (b) higher salaries of cabinet ministers are associated with lower corruption and better governance; (2) in democracies, somewhat surprisingly, there is no association between politician salaries and corruption/quality of governance. We propose that our findings can be explained by: electoral pressure, peer pressure, and mutual monitoring effects.
Rights: Nanyang Technological University
Fulltext Permission: restricted
Fulltext Availability: With Fulltext
Appears in Collections:HSS Student Reports (FYP/IA/PA/PI)

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