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|Title:||Improve the effectiveness of side channel attack: correlation-based power analysis in offline analysis||Authors:||Leo, Feng Yi||Keywords:||DRNTU::Engineering||Issue Date:||2016||Abstract:||In the current world there a different types of encryption standard and the most commonly used is the Advanced Encryption Standard . One of the most well-known and effective way of side channel attacks today is retrieving information which has been leaked through the power dissipated. Side channel information can be retrieved from the encrypted device with the power dissipated and the Ciphertext that is available to the attacker. The power dissipated can be measured using an oscilloscope Differential Power Analysis attack is one of the more commonly used attack compared to Simple Power Analysis attack. In this report of mine, I will be presenting on the Cryptography (which consist of Advanced Encryption Standards), Differential Power Analysis attack, Countermeasures towards the attacks, my methodology as well as my results and findings of my project. To attack the encrypted device, attackers use software platform that they develop to decrypt the Ciphertext to obtain the correct key. With the correct key, the attacker can reveal secret information from the device. Such software platforms could be developed using programming development platforms such as MATLAB, Java, Python and Microsoft Visual Studio. I will also be presenting on the methods on how I develop a SCA platform to reveal the key of the smartcards or cryptographic devices using Microsoft Visual Studio Programming Language C# and compare it with other SCA platform such as MATLAB which other attackers had developed.||URI:||http://hdl.handle.net/10356/68045||Rights:||Nanyang Technological University||Fulltext Permission:||restricted||Fulltext Availability:||With Fulltext|
|Appears in Collections:||EEE Student Reports (FYP/IA/PA/PI)|
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