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https://hdl.handle.net/10356/7237
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DC Field | Value | Language |
---|---|---|
dc.contributor.author | 杜金卿 Du, Jinqing | en_US |
dc.date.accessioned | 2008-09-18T07:42:02Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2008-09-18T07:42:02Z | - |
dc.date.copyright | 1999 | en_US |
dc.date.issued | 1999 | - |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10356/7237 | - |
dc.description.abstract | The reform of state-owned enterprises plays a center role in China's economic system reform. One of the key problems of state-owned enterprises in China is how to select, supervise and provide right incentives to their managers. The purpose of this paper is to find out a systematic method to solve the problem mentioned above. To do so, the paper analyses the managers' behavior of state-owned enterprises, based on the principal-agent theory and the survey of 60 managers of 20 enterprises in QingHuangDao City, P. R. China. | en_US |
dc.format.extent | 43 p. | - |
dc.language.iso | zh | - |
dc.rights | Nanyang Technological University | en_US |
dc.subject | DRNTU::Business::Industries and labor | - |
dc.subject | DRNTU::Business::Management::Leadership | - |
dc.title | 论中国国有企业经营者的选任,激励和监督机制 = Managers of state-owned enterprises in China : selection, incentive and supervision mechanism | en_US |
dc.type | Thesis | en_US |
dc.contributor.supervisor | Kang, Chen | en_US |
dc.contributor.school | Nanyang Business School | en_US |
dc.description.degree | Master of Science (Managerial Economics) | en_US |
item.fulltext | With Fulltext | - |
item.grantfulltext | restricted | - |
Appears in Collections: | NBS Theses |
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File | Description | Size | Format | |
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NBS-THESES_193.pdf Restricted Access | 6.61 MB | Adobe PDF | View/Open |
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