Epistemic virtues and ‘fake news’ : what are we missing?

Abstract

‘Fake news’ clearly poses a problem to society and our institutions. There appears to be an inability to differentiate the true from the false, if not an embrace of the untrue. This embrace of the untrue poses many interesting questions for epistemology: the study of knowledge and justified belief. Given that we agree that ‘fake news’ is a negative phenomenon, however, an even more important question is how we might understand and combat ‘fake news’. In this paper, I will identify intellectual virtues – namely, intellectual courage and impartiality – that have been lacking in our society, which has allowed ‘fake news’ as a phenomenon to take root. From there, I will examine the concept of social moral epistemology, and how it might act as a tool to investigate how social institutions might foster epistemic virtue. Finally, I will produce several recommendations that institutions and governments might follow to foster said epistemic virtues.