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|Title:||Differential Fault Attack on LEA||Authors:||Jap, Dirmanto
|Issue Date:||2015||Source:||Jap, D., & Breier, J. (2015). Differential Fault Attack on LEA. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, 9357, 265-274.||Series/Report no.:||Lecture Notes in Computer Science||Abstract:||LEA is a symmetric block cipher proposed in 2014. It uses ARX design and its main advantage is the possibility of a fast software implementation on common computing platforms. In this paper we propose a Differential Fault Analysis attack on LEA. By injecting random bit faults in the last round and in the penultimate round, we were able to recover the secret key by using 258 faulty encryptions in average. If the position of faults is known, then only 62 faulty encryptions are needed in order to recover the key which surpasses the results achieved so far.||URI:||https://hdl.handle.net/10356/80626
|DOI:||10.1007/978-3-319-24315-3||Rights:||© 2015 International Federation for Information Processing (IFIP). This is the author created version of a work that has been peer reviewed and accepted for publication by Lecture Notes in Computer Science, IFIP. It incorporates referee’s comments but changes resulting from the publishing process, such as copyediting, structural formatting, may not be reflected in this document. The published version is available at: [http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-24315-3].||Fulltext Permission:||open||Fulltext Availability:||With Fulltext|
|Appears in Collections:||SPMS Journal Articles|
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