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dc.contributor.authorChandramohan, Mahinthanen
dc.identifier.citationChandramohan, M. (2018). Scalable analysis for malware and vulnerability detection in binaries. Doctoral thesis, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore.en
dc.description.abstractIn recent years, malware (malicious software) has greatly evolved and has become very sophisticated. The evolution and the volume of malware make it difficult to analyze them in an effective and scalable manner. It is reported that, on average, more than 100,000 fresh malware binaries emerge each day. Despite the common use and widespread availability of various anti-malware tools, proliferation of malware poses a major security threat to computer systems. Identification of malware variants significantly improves the detection rate and reduces the size of malware signature databases. Thus, it has become crucial for security researchers to analyze and cluster malware samples based on their malicious behavior. Though manual analysis of malware may provide a better understanding of its malicious behavior, it is practically impossible due to the exponential growth in the number of new malware each day. As a result, security researchers are constantly playing the catch-up game with the malware authors. On the other hand, it is understood that software vulnerabilities are paving the way for malicious programs to find their targets, where attackers exploit the newly discovered vulnerabilities in the software systems to deliver their malicious payload. It is reported that more than 10,000 new vulnerabilities were reported in the first half of 2017. However, it is almost impossible to avoid vulnerabilities at the development stage (i.e., source code level); it is even difficult to discover vulnerabilities at the production stage (i.e., machine code level). Further, there are still lots of software applications in the wild with known security vulnerabilities that are unpatched even when the official patches are available. In most cases, attackers leverage on exploits written for such unpatched vulnerabilities to compromise the targets and achieve their malicious intent. Identifying the unpatched vulnerabilities and alerting the interested parties in a timely manner helps to significantly reduce the malware proliferation rate. In addition to detecting unpatched vulnerabilities, it is also important to identify potential vulnerable locations (or attack surfaces) within the software application that can turn into a zero-day (or 0-day) vulnerability in the future, which can be later exploited or weaponized by the malware authors to deliver malicious payloads. The first part of this thesis is dedicated to addressing the scalability issues in the existing malware behaviour modelling techniques. In this work, we propose and evaluate a bounded feature space behaviour modelling technique, named eBOFM, for effective and scalable malware detection and triaging tasks. The malware features extracted using eBOFM are very expressive in nature and provide valuable information to security analysts. Most importantly, the eBOFM feature space is bounded by an upper limit. Whereas, in existing malware behaviour modelling techniques, either the feature space grows in proportion to the size of the execution traces (e.g., n-gram models) or high computational power and memory is required (e.g., graph-based models), which makes them impractical to use in real-world malware detectors and triaging tools. We also perform large-scale experiments showing that, with eBOFM, computation time and memory usage are vastly lower than currently reported results in existing malware detection and clustering techniques, while preserving or even improving their high detection and clustering accuracy. The second part of this thesis is dedicated to addressing the challenges in identifying the security patches at machine code (or binary) level. Understanding of vulnerabilities and their corresponding patches at binary level allows us to generate better vulnerability signatures that are later used to detect unpatched vulnerabilities in the commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) binaries. In this work, we propose a scalable binary-level patch analysis framework, named SPAIN, which can automatically identify security patches and summarize patch patterns and their corresponding vulnerability patterns. The summarized patterns can be used to search similar patches or vulnerabilities in binary programs. Our experimental results on several real-world projects have shown that SPAIN can identify security patches with high accuracy and scalability. Using SPAIN, we have summarized the vulnerability and the corresponding patch patterns for five major class of vulnerabilities including use-after-free, double free, integer under(over) flow, null pointer dereference and buffer overflow. The third part of this thesis is dedicated to addressing the challenges in performing cross-architecture cross-platform binary matching. Architecture and platform agnostic binary matching is a vital component in detecting unpatched vulnerabilities, where vulnerability patterns are obtained using patch analysis (in our case, SPAIN) and they are matched against the binaries in the wild. Different from source code clone detection, clone detection (similar code search) in binary executables faces big challenges due to the significant differences in the syntax and the structure of binary code that result from different configurations of compilers, architectures and OSs. To address these challenges, in this work, we propose BINGO - a scalable and robust binary search engine supporting various architectures and operating systems. The key contributions include binary emulation and selective function inlining technique to capture the complete program semantics. Further, architecture and OS neutral function filtering is proposed to improve the scalability, where it removes the irrelevant functions from the matching process. Besides, we also introduce variant length partial traces to model binary functions in a program structure agnostic fashion. The experimental results show that BINGO can find semantic similar functions across architecture and OS boundaries, even with the presence of program structure distortion, in a scalable manner. Using BINGO, we also discovered a zero-day vulnerability in Adobe PDF Reader, a COTS binary. The final part of this thesis is dedicated to identifying potential attack surfaces within the software applications, where identifying potentially vulnerable locations in a code base is critical a pre-step for effective vulnerability assessment; i.e., it can greatly help security experts to put their time and effort where it is needed the most. In this work, we propose and implement a generic, lightweight and extensible framework, named Leopard, to identify attack surfaces at the~function level through program metrics. Leopard does not require any prior knowledge about known vulnerabilities. It works in two steps by combining two sets of systematically derived metrics. First, it uses complexity metrics to group the functions in a target application into a set of bins. Then, it leverages vulnerability metrics to rank the functions in each bin and identifies the top ones as potentially vulnerable. Experimental results on ten real-life projects have demonstrated that Leopard can cover 66% of vulnerabilities by identifying 20% of functions as vulnerable.en
dc.format.extent211 p.en
dc.subjectDRNTU::Engineering::Computer science and engineering::Softwareen
dc.titleScalable analysis for malware and vulnerability detection in binariesen
dc.contributor.supervisorLiu Yangen
dc.contributor.supervisorThambipillai Srikanthanen
dc.contributor.schoolSchool of Computer Science and Engineeringen
dc.description.degreeDoctor of Philosophyen
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