Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10356/82141
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dc.contributor.authorChen, Melvinen
dc.date.accessioned2016-08-10T05:59:01Zen
dc.date.accessioned2019-12-06T14:47:30Z-
dc.date.available2016-08-10T05:59:01Zen
dc.date.available2019-12-06T14:47:30Z-
dc.date.issued2014en
dc.identifier.citationChen, M. (2014). Strawson contra Strawson: Moral Responsibility and Semi-Compatibilism. The Philosophical Forum, 45(1), 1-15.en
dc.identifier.issn0031-806Xen
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/10356/82141-
dc.description.abstractThis paper addresses the Basic Argument in favour of incompatibilism, both in its Strawsonian form and in its weakened form (the CDA). After examining the worries raised by this argument, I will defend a version of semi-compatibilism that is motivated by a narrative theory of the self, arguing that moral responsibility is possible even if the thesis of determinism is taken to be incompatible with the thesis of freedom of will. The semi-compatibilist argument that I provide lowers the standard of proof, stops the regress of causes, finds a buck-stopper in the form of a self who can be held morally responsible for a choice or an action, and avoids committing the Strawsonian fallacy of circular reasoning by not setting impossible demands on moral responsibility.en
dc.language.isoenen
dc.relation.ispartofseriesThe Philosophical Forumen
dc.rights© 2014 The Philosophical Forum, Inc.en
dc.subjectSemi-compatibilismen
dc.subjectMetaethicsen
dc.titleStrawson contra Strawson: Moral Responsibility and Semi-Compatibilismen
dc.typeJournal Articleen
dc.contributor.schoolSchool of Humanities and Social Sciencesen
dc.identifier.doi10.1111/phil.12024en
item.fulltextNo Fulltext-
item.grantfulltextnone-
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